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should indicate, strict reliance on the Behrend rationale may result
in the continued use of inadequate step transaction analysis by the
courts.
BENTON CARUTHERS TOLLEY ITl
DAWKINS v. CRAIG: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND SUITS FOR RETROACTIVE
WELFARE PAYMENTS
State statutory restrictions on the distribution of funds made
available through joint federal-state welfare programs have recently
come under wide attack in the courts.' Actions challenging the state
restrictions have generally been successful in obtaining injunctions
against the future enforcement of state regulations deemed unconsti-
tutional or violative of federal law.2 However, when presented with a
prayer for the restoration of benefit payments withheld pursuant to
subsequently invalidated state restrictions, the federal courts are in
disagreement as to whether these suits are affected by the eleventh
amendment's 3 bar to actions against states by private citizens. Some
courts, concerned with the alleged injustice prevalent in a situation
that would allow a state to retain funds permanently when wrongfully
withheld from welfare recipients, have devised techniques to avoid
the application of the bar.' Other courts have viewed the action
'E.g., Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp.
61 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (three-judge dist. ct.); Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 149 (N.D.
Tex. 1970); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn. 1969) (three-judge dist.
Ct.).
2State regulations have been held in contravention of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (three-
judge dist. ct.); Triplett v. Cobb, 331 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Stoddard v.
Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566 (D. Me. 1971) (three-judge dist. ct.); Grubb v. Sterrett, 315
F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ind.) (three-judge dist. ct.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 922 (1970); Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969) (three-judge dist. ct.); Solman v. Shapiro,
300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn. 1969) (three-judge dist. ct.). State regulations have been
held violative of the equal protection clause. Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109
(D. Me. 1969) (three-judge dist. ct.); Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md.
1968) (three-judge dist. ct.).
'U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads in pertinent part:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State ....
'Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973) (suit for restitution of funds
unconstitutionally withheld, not for damages); Henry v. Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418, 421
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strictly as a suit for damages and have thus denied relief on the basis
of the eleventh amendment. ' This latter approach was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case of Dawkins v.
Craig.'
In Dawkins, a mother initiated an action in a three-judge district
court,7 on behalf of her fourteen year old daughter, against the North
Carolina Commissioner of Social Services, alleging that § 2210 of the
North Carolina Financial Services Manual8 contravened the Consti-
tution and the Social Security Act? The challenged regulation re-
quired that children eligible for welfare under the Aid to Families
with Dependant Children Act'6 (AFDC) be denied benefits if their
mother refused to institute a criminal support action against an ab-
sent father or husband. The plaintiffs sought not only declaratory and
injunctive relief from enforcement of the regulation, but also pay-
ment of all sums wrongfully withheld. Prior to the scheduled hearing,
the regulation was revised, thereby obviating the need for a decision
on the constitutional issue and the necessity for prospective relief.
(D. Alas. 1971) (three-judge dist. ct.) (viewed grant of past due benefits as a redistribu-
tion of funds previously allocated). Some courts have simply ignored the eleventh
amendment. See, e.g., Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ind.) (three-judge
dist. ct.), afJ'd, 400 U.S. 922 (1970); Brooks v. Yeatman, 311 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Tenn.
1969) (three-judge dist. ct.).
'Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973); Like v. Carter, 353 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
6483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973).
7Three-judge district courts hear allegations of unconstitutionality when four pre-
requisites are met: a state statute or regulation must be challenged, injunctive relief
must be sought, a state official or state board or commission must be a defendant, and
the state action must be claimed to be unconstitutional. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282
(1970). Such courts are composed of the district court judge in whose court the applica-
tion was originally filed, and two other judges designated by the chief judge of the
circuit, at least one of whom is a circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1970).
Three-judge district courts were devised in reaction to the states' criticism of the
decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which empowered a single federal
judge to declare state action unconstitutional. See generally, Comment, Federal In-
junctions Against State Actions, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 744, 756 (1967); Note, Three-
Judge Court Practice Under Section 2281, 53 GEO. L.J. 431, 435-44 (1965).
'The North Carolina Financial Services Manual § 2210 reads in relevant part:
[If it is established that a parent (or parents) has deserted or aban-
doned his children, the applicant or recipient payee should agree to
institute a non-support action against the deserting parent (or par-
ents) where the applicant or recipient can identify the parent . ...
483 F.2d at 1192. The provision has since been revised to meet the plaintiff's objections.
Id. See text accompanying notes 10, 11 infra.
'483 F.2d at 1193.
"42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
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Due to this revision, the case was removed from the three-judge dis-
trict court to a single judge district court" for consideration of the
prayer for retroactive relief. The district court ordered the defendants
to pay the plaintiffs the benefits they would have received had the
unlawful regulation not been in force.'
2
The sole issue on appeal was whether the district court's order
contravened the eleventh amendment. The Fourth Circuit conclu-
sively found that the eleventh amendment forbids the exercise of
federal jurisdiction in suits for retroactive welfare benefits where a
state has not waived its immunity. In reaching this decision the court
rejected two contentions advanced by the appellees. First, they as-
serted that the eleventh amendment did not apply to suits of this
nature. Second, the appellees maintained that, even if the amend-
ment was applicable, North Carolina had nevertheless constructively
waived its eleventh amendment immunity by participating in the
AFDC program.
The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment explicitly forbids the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in suits brought against a state by citizens of other
states.'3 In addition, states are immune from suits commenced
against them by their own citizens." This additional immunity, the
source of which is unclear, has been attributed both to a judicial
expansion of the eleventh amendment'5 and to the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.'6
"Because the statute was no longer alleged to be unconstitutional, one of the
requirements for three-judge district court jurisdiction no longer existed. See note 7
supra.
"The decision of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
delivered on October 4, 1972, is unreported. The court also held that the case was
properly maintainable as a class action and defined the class.
"See note 3 supra.
"See notes 15 and 16 infra.
'"In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), the Court stated: "Can we suppose
that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open
for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of
suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?"
It is not clear whether the Court based its reasoning on the eleventh amendment
or upon common law sovereign immunity. However, many courts have accepted the
eleventh amendment rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,
140 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Scott
v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964); Skokomish Indian Tribe v.
France, 269 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1959); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F.
Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see note 16 infra.
"In McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739, 740 (4th Cir. 1946), the court held
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History indicates that this extension of immunity from suit is
founded in the common law rather than the Constitution. Prior to the
adoption of the eleventh amendment there was an assumption that
the Constitution would not alter the common law concept that a state
could not be sued without its consent, ," even though article I ex-
tended the judicial power of the United States to controversies be-
tween "a State and Citizens of another State."' ' The Supreme Court
set aside this assumption in Chisolm v. Georgia,'" when it permitted
an action to be brought against the State of Georgia by a citizen of
South Carolina."' Subsequently, the eleventh amendment was
adopted to nullify the holding of that case.21 However, since immun-
that states' immunity from suit by their own citizens "does not arise from the restric-
tion of the llth Amendment. . . . Rather it comes from what Hamilton described in
the Federalist as the 'inherent . . . nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent.'" (emphasis in original).
'7See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (Rev. ed.
1947):
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant
and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep
apprehension and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution; but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed
by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Govern-
ment, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the
fear of the existence of such federal power that the Constitution was
finally adopted.
"U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 cl. 1 reads:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases
affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls; to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two
or more states, between a state and citizens of another state ....
"12 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16 (1793).
2
0In Chisolm, Justice Cushing felt that the Constitution was clear in the scope of
the jurisdiction granted to the federal courts. Cushing stated: "When a citizen makes
a demand against a State of which he is not a citizen, it is really a controversy between
a State and a citizen of another State, as if such State made a demand against such
citizen." 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 56. Chief Justice Jay in his opinion went further than
Justice Cushing. The Chief Justice not only found thatamenability to suit was com-
patible with sovereignty but also asserted that the sovereignty of the nation was vested
in the people and that the sovereignty of the states only applied to citizens of the
particular state. 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 60.
2 1For a detailed account of the relationship between Chilsolm and the eleventh
amendment, see Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the
White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. Rv. 1, 10-14 (1967); Guthrie, The
Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the Unites States, 8 COLUM. L.
REv. 183, 184-86 (1908).
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ity for a state when sued by its own citizens was not at issue in
Chisolm, the amendment arguably does not speak to that situation.
Thus, the extension of immunity to suits of this type was apparently
nothing more than a judicial reaffirmation of the common law con-
cept of sovereign immunity.
A means of circumventing the jurisdictional bar, imposed either
by the eleventh amendment or by concepts of sovereign immunity,2
was introduced in 1824 when the Supreme Court declared that the
amendment prohibited only those suits "in which the state is a party
on the record. '2 3 This decision fostered the practice of naming a state
official as the defendant of record, thereby effectively enabling citi-
zens to sue the state. The Supreme Court properly identified this
practice as a suit against the state and banned it in In re Ayers.24
However, an exception to the Ayers prohibition survives. Where
an action by a state is alleged to contravene the Federal Constitution,
the Supreme Court has permitted a suit to be brought in a federal
court against a named state official.? In Ex Parte Young, 6 the Court
held:
[T]he officer in proceeding under such [unconstitutional]
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
[the] Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his offi-
cial or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has
12For a discussion of the relationship between sovereign immunity and the eleventh
amendment, see Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2
GA. L. REv. 207, 215-30 (1968).
20sborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251 (1824).
"123 U.S. 443 (1887). Ayers involved an attempt by taxpayers to compel the
Commonwealth of Virginia to accept bond coupons as payment for taxes owed. The
Attorney General of Virginia was named as the party-defendant. In its determination
that the suit was not within the scope of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
stated:
It must be regarded as a settled doctrine of this court, established
by its recent decisions, "that the question whether a suit is within the
prohibition of the 11th Amendment is not always determined by refer-
ence to the nominal parties on the record." Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270, 287 [1884]. This, it is true, is not in harmony with what
was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251 (1824)].
Id. at 487.
2Although Young only spoke to contraventions of the Constitution, its doctrine
has also been applied where state action violates federal law. E.g., Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
2209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States.?
Thus, suits to compel state officials to act in accordance with federal
law are not considered suits against the state. This "fiction"2 has
been used to gain federal jurisdiction over challenges to a variety of
state actions, including collection of taxes from a tax-exempt organi-
zation,21 segregation of schools, " failure of a state to act on welfare
applications, ' ' and patent infringement.12 However, there has been
considerable reluctance on the part of the courts to extend the Young
fiction to suits that could result in direct expenditures from a state's
treasury pursuant to a federal court order.
3
The jurisdictional bar to suits against a state can be avoided if the
state has constructively waived its immunity. This concept was intro-
duced in Parden v. Terminal Railway,34 where the Supreme Court
held that Alabama, by operating a railroad in interstate commerce,
had constructively consented to suit under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.3' The Court found that "when a State leaves the sphere
that is exclusively its own and enters into activity subject to federal
regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a
private person or corporation. 3 6 However, the scope of constructive
waiver was limited by the recent decision in Employees v. Depart-
ment of Public Health &Welfare.3 7 In Employees, the Supreme Court
considered an action commenced by resident employees of Missouri
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 3 It found that Missouri
had not waived its immunity from suit by simply maintaining an
administrative labor force. The Court distinguished Parden on the
27 d. at 159-60.
2'Commentators have used this term to describe the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
See Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretations
and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1492 (1973).
"Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
3 Orleans Parish School Dist. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 921 (1957).
3 Shapiro v. Thompson, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967) (three-judge dist. ct.),
aff'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
32Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway Dep't., 337 F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn.
1972).
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973); Like v. Carter, 353 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
-377 U.S. 184 (1964).
"Id. at 192. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
3377 U.S. at 196.
37411 U.S. 279 (1973).
3129 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
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grounds that Alabama had a proprietary interest in its venture into
a federally regulated area, as opposed to Missouri's strictly govern-
mental interest in Employees. The Court characterized the state ac-
tivity in Parden as "dramatic" and "isolated," while stating that the
problems in Employees "may well implicate [all employees] . . . in
every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." 9 How-
ever, since the Supreme Court chose to distinguish rather than to
overrule Parden, the present scope of implied waiver remains uncer-
tain.
Application of the Eleventh Amendment
In Dawkins, the Fourth Circuit noted the uncertainty of the ex-
tent of implied waiver"0 but held that North Carolina's participation
in the AFDC program was not a sufficient entry into an area of federal
regulation to apply the concept of constructive waiver found in
Parden.4 ' Instead, the court relied upon Employees as support for its
contention that there had been no waiver.12 The court in Dawkins also
refused to extend the Young fiction to suits for retroactive welfare
payments and therefore declined jurisdiction. 3 In establishing its
position on the issues of the application of the eleventh amendment
and waiver of immunity, the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with the
Second Circuit.4
The Dawkins court recognized the basic principle of the Young
fiction by conceding that the district court may have had jurisdiction
to enjoin the enforcement of the regulation as initially challenged had
it not been satisfactorily amended.4 5 Thus, when faced with the claim
for retroactive payments, the Fourth Circuit unequivocally asserted
that its jurisdiction over the action was barred by the eleventh
amendment, because the relief sought "look[ed] directly to the pay-
ment of public funds out of the State treasury."' 8 The opinion pro-
vided no elaboration on this issue but cited the Second Circuit case,
Rothstein v. Wyman,4 7 as support for its conclusion.
31411 U.S. at 285.




"See notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
15483 F.2d at 1194.
,'Id.
1tId. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973), involved a constitutional challenge to a New York statute that provided for a
higher level of payments to recipients in the New York City area than to those in the
19741
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As in Dawkins, the Rothstein court considered the effect of the
eleventh amendment upon a suit to compel a state to make retroac-
tive welfare payments. Concluding that such a suit is barred from a
federal forum, the court stated:
It is equally a part of the lore of the Eleventh Amendment that,
even though a state may not be named as a party defendant,
any judgment declaring a liability which must be met from the
public funds of the state does come within the reach of the
Eleventh Amendment; and a court will, absent the state's con-
sent, be deemed without jurisdiction to enter such a judg-
ment."
The Second Circuit cited Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury"
as authority. In Ford, the Supreme Court identified the state as "the
real, substantial party in interest"' when plaintiffs seek a monetary
judgment against the state but name individual officials as defen-
dants. Because Indiana was the actual defendant, the Court sus-
tained the invocation of sovereign immunity.7'
Ford involved an action to recover state taxes which had been
collected under an allegedly unconstitutional statute. Superficially,
this case appears distinguishable from the welfare cases because the
action was initiated pursuant to a state statute creating a cause of
action for tax refunds in state courts.52 However, this distinction was
surrounding seven counties under the joint federal-state program of Aid to the Aged,
Blind and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). The Second Circuit enjoined the
enforcement of the state statute but refused to entertain the suit for retroactive pay-
ments on the grounds that the principles of equity, comity, and federalism preclude
federal courts from ordering states to make retroactive payments. The court bolstered
its decision by the use of the eleventh amendment, but it could have relied solely on
equitable principles.
"1467 F.2d at 236.
"1323 U.S. 459 (1945). This case is often cited in connection with Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946), and Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47 (1944).
"'323 U.S. at 464.
51d.
"5The Seventh Circuit did attempt to make this distinction. Speaking of Ford, the
Jordan court stated:
[Tihose cases involved non-resident suits under state-created causes
of action for a refund of state taxes allegedly assessed in violation of
the Constitution. They reflect the special considerations that dictate
noninterference by the federal judiciary in the enforcement of state
tax laws where there is an express remedial procedure provided in
state courts.
472 F.2d at 992. But the court in Jordan failed to mention Redwine, note 29 supra.
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arguably rendered invalid when the Supreme Court indicated in
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine 3 that the restriction
found in Ford also applied to parties that invoked the Young fiction
to gain federal jurisdiction for their claims. In Redwine, the Court
held that a suit to enjoin the State Revenue Commissioner from
levying a tax in violation of the Constitution was within the scope of
the Young fiction and thus was not a suit against the state.-4 In
dictum, Chief Justice Vinson emphasized that because the suit did
not request affirmative relief in the form of a monetary judgment
from the state, it was not restricted by the Ford decision.5 Accord-
ingly, the Fourth Circuit in Dawkins was able to cite substantial
authority in support of its assertion that suits against a state for
monetary relief are not within the parameters of Young and are
barred by the eleventh amendment.
Despite this authority supporting the Fourth Circuit's position on
the application of the eleventh amendment, the Seventh Circuit has
held that the amendment does not bar suits for retroactive welfare
payments. In Jordan v. Weaver,5 the Seventh Circuit asserted that
"[wihether a liability is declared which must be met from the state's
public funds is not the touchstone of the Eleventh Amendment's
applicability." 57 The court explained that injunctive relief from the
enforcement of unconstitutional regulations, the type of relief consid-
ered within the bounds of a legitimate suit, would necessarily require
the state to disburse more money than it had been spending under a
lawful statute. This additional expenditure would be attributable to
the increase in the number of eligible recipients, an increase result-
ing from the nullification of the restrictive regulation. The Seventh
Circuit did not feel a distinction should be drawn between the latter
type of expenditure and retroactive relief since both resulted from
judicial mandate. 8
The court in Jordan also indicated that a number of three-judge
district courts 9 had resolved the issue of the applicability of the
Had it done so it may have reached an opposite conclusion. See text accompanying
note 53-55, infra.
5342 U.S. 299 (1952).
51Id. at 304. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
342 U.S. at 304-05 n.15.
"'472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 991.
-"Id.
5'Zarate v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Svcs, 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.
Fla. 1971) (three-judge dist. ct.), aff'd mem., 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v. Bowens,
397 U.S. 49 (1970), aft'g per curiam, Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (three-judge dist ct.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), aff'g 270 F.
1974]
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eleventh amendment to suits for retroactive welfare benefits. Each of
these courts reached the same result as the Jordan court and each
case was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court. However, only
one, Shapiro v. Thompson, " was the subject of a full opinion by the
Court, and the eleventh amendment was not discussed.
These three-judge district court cases were also presented by the
appellees in Dawkins to support their contention that the eleventh
amendment was inapplicable. The Fourth Circuit challenged the pre-
cedental value of these decisions by citing Francis v. Davidson," a
three-judge district court case that forbade the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. The court in Francis, dealing with a constitutional chal-
lenge to a Maryland regulation that restricted the availability of
AFDC funds to families with unemployed fathers, disposed of the
issue, stating that "the Eleventh Amendment does not permit this
Court to require the State of Maryland . . . to pay AFDC-E claims
which would have been presented to and paid by the State of Mary-
land . . . but for the disqualifying provision . . . ."I The Fourth
Circuit in Dawkins recognized the conflicts among these three-judge
district courts but noted that the Supreme Court did not discuss the
application of the eleventh amendment in any of them.13 This conflict
illustrates the necessity for resolution of the issue by the Supreme
Court, which will apparently have to choose between the palatable
rationale in Jordan and the reasoning in Dawkins, which is more
consistent with judicial precedent."
Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967) (three-judge dist. ct.).
1-394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.) (three-judge dist. ct.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
The district court in Francis v. Davidson determined that the suit was one for damages
and, hence, was against the state. Without further elaboration the court dismissed the
claim as violative of the eleventh amendment. 340 F. Supp. at 370.
The district courts in Shapiro v. Thompson, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967)
(three-judge dist. ct.) aff'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Zarate v. De-
partment of Health & Rehabilitative Svcs. 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (three-
judge dist. ct.) aff'd mem. 407 U.S. 918 (1972), are diametrically opposed to the
position taken in Francis. Zarate did not discuss the eleventh amendment but estab-
lished jurisdiction by stating that "as a rule where a Three-Judge Court has jurisdic-
tion to grant or refuse an injunction, it has jurisdiction to impose conditions upon the
granting of an injunction." 347 F. Supp. at 1009. The three-judge court in Thompson
discussed the eleventh amendment in a footnote to the opinion but concluded that Ex
Parte Young permitted the ordering of retroactive relief. 270 F. Supp. at 338 n.5.
11340 F. Supp. at 370.
a4 8 3 F.2d at 1194.
"See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
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Waiver
The question of the extent of the eleventh amendment's jurisdic-
tional bar could have been resolved had the Fourth Circuit held that
AFDC funding was conditioned upon a constructive waiver of North
Carolina's immunity from suit. However, the court chose to align
itself with the Employees decision 5 rather than to find an implied
waiver of immunity. In support of its position, the Dawkins court
relied upon a narrow interpretation of the distinction between
Employees and Parden6  The court assumed that, after the
Employees decision, constructive waiver could be applied only where
the state had entered a sphere of activity subject to federal regulation
and was also involved in interstate commerce for proprietary pur-
poses. The Fourth Circuit declared:
We believe that the distinction drawn in Employees should
equally apply here. North Carolina's purpose in operating an
AFDC program is purely humanitarian, not proprietary as was
the railroad in Parden. We note also that while there has been
a tremendous increase in involvement by the federal govern-
ment in the area of public health and welfare, that area is still
the primary domain of the State governments. In any event,
the connection with interstate commerce, which was a sub-
stantial factor in the outcome of Parden, is lacking here. 7
This interpretation is valid only if the sole considerations involved
in the determination of the existence of implied waiver are those
mentioned by the Fourth Circuit. However, in Employees the Su-
preme Court considered two other factors which were not mentioned
by the court in Dawkins. First, § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act" (FLSA) provides not only for the recovery of unpaid wages but
also for the recovery of an equal amount as liquidated damages and
attorneys' fees. While refusing jurisdiction in the FLSA claim, the
Supreme Court noted that it is "one thing . . . to make a state
employee whole; it is quite another to allow him to recover double
"Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See
notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
"6Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See notes 34-39 supra and accompa-
nying text.
17483 F.2d at 1195.
6129 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) provides in relevant part: "Any employer who violates
the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages."
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against a State."" Although the Fourth Circuit did not consider this
factor, the plaintiffs' claim in Dawkins could not have resulted in an
inflated judgment against the state because they sought only the
amount of benefits wrongfully withheld."' In fact, one court has even
categorized the claim in Dawkins as one for restitution instead of
damages.
7'
Second, under the FLSA, the employees can sue to obtain actual
and punitive damages; 2 but the Supreme Court is on record as oppos-
ing the claim for punitive damages if it is directed toward a state.
73
The FLSA also empowers the Secretary of Labor to sue on behalf of
the workers to obtain actual damages,74 and the Supreme Court sup-
ports the availability of such a remedy.72 Thus, while the FLSA pro-
vides avenues by which the injured employee can obtain either actual
and punitive damages or just actual damages, the Court favors only
the provision for actual damages if the suit is against a state in its
capacity as an employer. However, even this limited remedy exceeds
that available to the plaintiffs in Dawkins.
The availability of a forum in which to assert claims for retroac-
tive welfare payments has been of concern to the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. Legislation has been proposed which
would require retroactive payments in cases of conflict between state
and federal statutes,7 6 as was present in Dawkins before the regula-
tion was revised.7 7 Further, federal regulations already provide for
retroactive relief if it is determined at an administrative hearing that
a recipient was denied assistance by improper agency action.78 The
proposal coupled with the regulations indicate the desire of the De-
69411 U.S. at 286.
"n483 F.2d at 1192.
7 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973).
72See note 68 supra.
11411 U.S. at 286.
7129 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
11411 U.S. at 285-86.
61H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 169-70 (1970).
71See note 8 supra.
7-45 C.F.R. § 205.10(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Federal Financial participation.
Federal Financial participation is available for the following items:
(2) Payments of assistance made to carry out hearing decisions, or
to take corrective action after an appeal but prior to a hearing, or to
extend the benefit of a hearing decision or a court order to others in
the same situation as those directly affected by the decision or order.
Such payments may be retroactive in accordance with applicable Fed-
eral policies on corrective payments.
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partment of Health, Education and Welfare to insure the availability
of a forum in which retroactive welfare benefits can be claimed. Pur-
suant to judicial interpretation of the state constitution, North Caro-
lina courts are closed to suits for retroactive welfare payments."
Thus, the appellees in Dawkins lacked a forum in which to seek such
relief. By barring access to the federal courts, the Fourth Circuit has
effectively denied welfare recipients any possibility of gaining a via-
ble remedy when benefits have been wrongfully withheld.
In addition to the considerations of alternative methods of relief
and double damages, certain discrepancies between the facts in
Employees and those in Dawkins weaken the Fourth Circuit's reli-
ance on Employees. In both cases, state action was governed in part
by federal regulations." However, in Dawkins, as opposed to
Employees, the federal government not only regulated but also pro-
vided funds to the state for use in the effectuation of the AFDC
program. By accepting federal monies, states may subject themselves
to regulation by the Congress and the Executive concerning the dis-
bursement of those federal funds. Since the federal judiciary is the
primary interpreter of federal regulations and statutes, states receiv-
ing such grants may thus constructively subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of federal courts to facilitate the uniform interpretation
and application of those regulations. Thus, while the Fourth Circuit's
refusal to find a constructive waiver of immunity by North Carolina
was not unfounded, there are ample rationale for an opposite result.
"N.C. CONST. art. V, § 7(1) (1970) provides:
(1) State Treasury. No money shall be drawn from the State treas-
ury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and an accur-
ate account of the receipts and expenditures of State funds shall be
annually published.
The North Carolina courts have held that this section bars any judicial action to
enforce collection of liabilities against the state. Also, courts cannot direct the state
treasurer to pay such claims, however just and unquestioned, unless there is a legisla-
tive appropriation to pay the same. Garner v. Worth, 122 N.C. 250, 29 S.E. 364 (1898).
The holding in Garner was effectively incorporated into the 1970 constitution.
',The AFDC program is authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970), which
provides that sums will be made available to states which have submitted a suitable
plan for aid and services to needy families to the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. The actual administration is left to the states, but the states must conform
to federal regulations promulgated by HEW pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1352 (1970).
North Carolina indicated its statutory acceptance of the program at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 108-45 (Repl. vol. 1966).
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 99 201 et seq. (1970) applies to employ-
ers engaged in interstate commerce. In 1966, the act was made applicable to states in
their capacities as employers with regard to hospitals, institutions, and schools. 29
U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970), amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1962).
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Effect of the Fourth Circuit's Position
The Fourth Circuit's disposition of the issue of waiver would have
been more appealing had it examined some of the ramifications of its
decision. The Second Circuit in Rothstein contemplated three varia-
bles that would be affected by barring suits for retroactive welfare
payments from the federal courts. These variables were the possibil-
ity of wilful state violations of federal welfare regulations, the proba-
bility of increased tension in federal-state relations, and the fulfill-
ment of the ascertained needs of impoverished persons."'
The Second Circuit raised and subsequently discarded the con-
tention that by denying retroactive welfare payments, a state could
wilfully contravene federal laws and the Constitution without fear of
reprisal. The court in Rothstein concluded that nothing in the facts
of that case indicated any wilful action on the part of the state, and
mere conjecture as to the possibility of its occurence was not a suffi-
cient impetus to establish federal jurisdiction over the claim for retro-
active payments."2 However, the Seventh Circuit in Jordan indicated
that even the possibility of calculated state action designed to violate
federal plans was a substantial threat to congressional interests and,
consequently, the court ordered the State of Illinois to make repara-
tions to the plaintiff.,"
Many invalidated state statutes have conditioned welfare pay-
ments on some moral standard."' Others have made payments contin-
gent upon forbearance of action by the recipients.s Conceivably, a
state legislature might feel justified in subjecting potential welfare
recipients to higher standards than those prescribed by the federal
government. In this more restrictive form, such statutes would not
imply a malicious intent on the part of the state, but the wilful
contravention of a federal regulation or constitutional standard would
8'467 F.2d at 235.
"Id. In Rothstein, the court stated "[tihere is nothing to suggest that the state
consistently follows a course of unlawful conduct which requires that it be dramatically
confronted by the minatory face of the federal courts." Id.
'1472 F.2d at 994-95.
"Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969) (three-judge dist. ct.) (state
regulations conditioned AFDC benefits to unwed mothers on the disclosure of the
father's name); Machado v. Hackney, 299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex. 1969) (three-judge
dist. ct.) (state regulations forbade benefits under AFDC if there was a man other than
the father living with the mother).
'Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566 (D. Me. 1971) (three-judge dist. ct.) (state
regulations forbade welfare assistance if the father had enlisted in the army, while
there was no such restriction on draftees); Ojeda v. Hackney, 319 F. Supp. 149 (N.D.
Tex. 1970) (state regulations forbade benefits under the AFDC if the child had a step-
parent).
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still be present. The absence of malice, coupled with the present
concern of the federal courts over the concept of "co-operative feder-
alism,"8 renders unlikely any finding by federal courts of a wilful
state violation. If this-finding is considered a prerequisite to an award
of retroactive payments, then the subsequent award of such pay-
ments is improbable. In effect, a state could violate federal standards
without fear of reprisal. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's concern over
what amounts to wilful state violations appears well founded.
The Fourth Circuit should also have considered the effect of its
decision in Dawkins upon the relationship between the state and
federal governments. The Second Circuit in Rothstein advanced the
contention that Congress' purpose in enacting welfare programs such
as the AFDC was to encourage the state to make generous use of their
own funds to aid their impoverished citizens through the incentive of
matching grants. 7 However, the degree of control the federal govern-
ment, as grantor, sought to retain over the use of the funds is unclear.
The Rothstein court did not accept the contention that the "federal
interest in retroactively correcting the misuse of federal funds...
can by itself justify the significant increase in federal-state tension
which would result from a court order requiring the state to expend
its funds against its will." This position is supported by the fact that
the Supreme Court has recently described the AFDC program as
"based upon a scheme of co-operative federalism." 9 The court in
Rothstein held that this co-operative federalism dictated a hands-off
policy to the federal judiciary when faced with a claim for retroactive
welfare payments. By declining to exercise federal jurisdiction over
the claims, the Fourth and Second Circuits in Dawkins and Rothstein
did not add to this tension.
Finally, the decision in Dawkins affected the fundamental goal of
national welfare legislation, which is the satisfaction of the ascer-
tained needs of impoverished persons. 0 The Rothstein court dis-
cussed this goal and concluded that the satisfaction of ascertained
needs was of little consequence on the facts of that case because of
the interval between the last contested payment and the district
court's order of retroactive relief. Since the time lapse was sixteen
months, the Second Circuit ruled that the retroactive order would be
"See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968). See text accompanying note
89 infra.
"467 F.2d at 235.
sxId.
'King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
"467 F.2d at 235.
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compensatory rather than remedial.9 ' While this analysis is appealing
at first glance, it is based on a questionable proposition. To justify
this premise, the assumption must be accepted that persons who are
once deprived of an ascertained level of subsistence no longer suffer
the consequences of their deprivation. This assumption is questiona-
ble because it does not consider loss of health, dignity, proper hous-
ing, and various other events that could occur when funds are with-
held from an indigent.
The most equitable solution to a claim for retroactive welfare
benefits in relation to fulfilling the ascertained needs of impoverished
persons was provided by the district court in Machado v. Hackney.92
The court in Machado allowed the plaintiff to recover retroactive
payments, but only to the extent that they exceeded the actual
amount of financial support the plaintiff received during the con-
tested time period.9 3 While this method of resolution poses several
proof problems, it would restore to the welfare recipient only the
amount determined to be a proper level of subsistence. Such a rem-
edy may still be compensatory but it allows for the fact that the
plaintiff was sustained upon something while welfare benefits were
withheld. If the Fourth Circuit had disposed of the claim in Dawkins
in the manner suggested by Machado, the tension between the federal
and state governments conceivably would have been increased, but
this result would have fulfilled the needs of the impoverished plaintiff
and acted as a deterrent to wilful state violations of federal regula-
tions.
Conclusion
In view of the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court
should resolve the issue of the eleventh amendment's bar to suits for
retroactive welfare payments. The Fourth Circuit's position in
Dawkins is amply supported by judicial precedent, but the rationale
and the result reached by the Seventh Circuit in Jordan is the more
equitable resolution of the controversy. The Court will have to con-
sider the controversy in light of its past decisions while balancing the
interests affected. To preserve both the integrity of past decisions and
the sanctity of a constitutional protection, the Court should rule the
eleventh amendment applicable to suits against states for retroactive
welfare payments. However, in the interest of providing a forum for
the complete adjudication of controversies involving a federal consti-
9id.
11299 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tex. 1969) (three-judge dist. ct.).
"Id. at 646.
